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I
INTRODUCTION

There was no precedent for the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust
("Trust"). A grantor trust, its genesis, birth, and evolution were influenced
by-and its operation is still influenced by-many groups with differing
agendas: the Manville Corporation, multiple federal and state courts, legal
experts, investment bankers, victims' groups, plaintiffs' attorneys, Trust staff,
and other trusts. The development and evolution of the Trust were further
affected by a myriad of state and federal laws on, inter alia, trusts, securities
regulation, contracts, fiduciary responsibility, bankruptcy, and civil procedure.
These often conflicting constituencies and laws were forced into a
compromise "peace" during the upheaval of the Johns-Manville Corporation'
2
chapter 11 bankruptcy filing.
The Trust, an independent organization, was created by the bankruptcy
court to distribute funds as equitably as possible while balancing the rights of
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1. In 1988 the Johns-Manville Corporation was renamed The Manville Corporation, and will
be referred to hereafter as "Manville."
2. In December 1986, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York approved a plan of reorganization ("Plan") for the Manville Corporation and related entities.
See In the Matter ofjohns-Manville Corporation, 68 Bankr 618 (Bankr SD NY 1986). See also Manville
Corporation Second Amended and Restated Plan of Reorganization and Related Documents as
Executed and Consummated at Plan Consummation C-80 to C- 135 (November 28, 1988) (containing
the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust Agreement) ("Second Amended Plan"). A
cornerstone of the Plan was the creation of the Trust to compensate individuals suffering personal
injury from exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing products sold by the Manville Corporation.
Following several appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confirmed the Plan on
October 28, 1988. 843 F2d 636 (2d Cir 1988). The Trust became operational thirty days later on
November 28, 1988.
Although Manville Corporation has not manufactured asbestos products since 1974 (with the
exception of certain specialty products for the U.S. Department of Defense and the National
Aeronautics Space Administration), asbestos-related diseases, such as asbestosis, lung cancer, and
mesothelioma, can have substantial latency periods before symptoms appear. Thus, millions of
American workers who were exposed to harmful asbestos fibers while asbestos was produced may
only now be developing asbestos-related diseases.
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current claimants against those of future, unknown claimants. 3 It was
established as a negotiation-based settlement organization, designating its
claimants as beneficiaries. (Co-defendants are also named beneficiaries.)
Plan provisions made it clear that claimants did not need to litigate or
threaten to litigate in order to negotiate a fair settlement. The Trust was
committed to settling as many claims as quickly and fairly as possible in the
order specified in the Plan. Although the Trust never wavered from this
commitment, it quickly became clear that the full Plan would be impossible to
implement.
During 1990-91, the Trust participated in a process initiated by the United
States District Courts for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York in
an attempt to find a workable solution to the mismatch of available funds and
volume of incoming claims. To preserve remaining Trust assets, the courts,
under Judge Jack B. Weinstein, ordered the Trust to renegotiate its financial
relationship with Manville Corporation and to revamp its claims handling
procedures. At the heart of these efforts to restructure the liabilities and
assets of the Trust is a broad-based attempt to have a limited-fund class action
certihed as a means to revise the rules governing the order and method of
claims evaluation and payment.
At the time of this writing, the Trust's operations are governed by a
stipulation of settlement filed on November 19, 1990, and concurrent court
orders staying Trust payments and settlements. 4 The Plan's claims resolution
procedures are soon to be replaced. Fairness hearings also are currently
underway to determine whether all interested parties have been fairly
represented and whether the Trust's claimants should be declared a class. As
a final (nonappealable) court order redefining the Trust's mandates and
procedures is not expected for some time, it is premature to discuss these
procedures here. Rather, this article covers the genesis of the Trust, the
process that formed it, and the Trust's unique attributes, strengths, and
weaknesses. It concludes with a discussion of the lessons learned that can
inform the design, implementation, and operation of future claims resolution
facilities.
II
THE MANVILLE BANKRUPTCY

Between 1858 and the late 1970s, Johns-Manville Corporation produced
more than 600 different asbestos products for a wide variety of industrial and
construction needs. By the mid-1960s, when an epidemiological study
documented the health dangers of asbestos exposure, Manville owned and
operated several asbestos mines, and had thirty manufacturing plants in the
United States and at least a controlling interest in eight overseas plants.
3. For the declared purposes of the Trust, see Second Amended Plan at C-80 par 2.02 (cited in
note 2).
4. See Stipulation of Settlement and Orders to Show Cause, Findlev v Blinken, NYAL 4000 (E &
SD NY, November 19, 1990).

Page 27: Autumn 1990]

MANVILLE PERSONAL INJURY TRUST

Manville made and sold asbestos products in three different forms: solid,
as in exterior and interior insulation; soft or pliable, as in felt blankets,
packing, and other material used to insulate boilers, steam engines, pipe
joints, and air compressors; and granular or loose, as in a wide range of
asbestos cements. These products were used in markets described by
economists as "industrial" rather than "consumer," that is, Manville sold the
products, primarily through distributors, to industries that used the products
to make goods for later sale in the consumer market. Thus, the individuals
most likely to be exposed to asbestos fibers through the handling of
Manville's asbestos products were skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers
in a number of different industries and trades, including shipping,
construction, insulation, utilities, oil and chemical refining, and
manufacturing and maintenance of automobile parts, railroad cars, aerospace,
and electrical equipment. During the 1960s, workers in these industries and
trades began filing lawsuits against asbestos manufacturers, including
Manville, alleging personal injury from asbestos exposure. By 1982, the
lawsuits against Manville alone numbered more than 16,500, with more than
400 new cases filed each month. Projections at that time for the total number
of Manville personal injury claimants ranged from 50,000 to 200,000. 5 This

unexpected deluge of claims overwhelmed court dockets and confronted
Manville with a then-estimated liability for personal injury claims in excess of
$2 billion through the year 2001.6
In August 1982, Manville filed a petition for reorganization and protection
under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 7 which automatically suspended
all personal injury lawsuits and allowed Manville to reorganize, thus
preserving its financial viability to compensate asbestos claimants.
III
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRUST

The 1988 Plan of Reorganization represented four years of negotiation
between the bankruptcy court, Manville, and the court-appointed
representatives for existing asbestos claimants, ftiture, unknown claimants,
and co-defendants. To finalize the agreement, the negotiators, assisted by
5. By mid-January 1991, the Trust had received more than 170,000 claims.
6. As with many significant corporate events, the myopia of time has caused corporate
historians to remember events in different ways. There is some evidence, however, to support the
majority corporate view that, after it had been sued in over 10,000 cases, Manville conducted its own
epidemiological survey, which concluded that scores of thousands of additional plaintiffs would file
personal injury actions against Manville requiring billions of dollars for defense costs and payments
ofjudgments and settlements. After the new survey results were distributed to Manville's board of
directors, the corporation's independent auditors took the position that the survey conclusions
created a contingent liability, which, according to the Accounting Board Standards for General
Purposes Accounting, had to be reflected on Manville's balance sheet. As with commercial creditors
of most major corporations, Manville's commercial creditors had the right to accelerate repayment of
their loans if Manville's balance sheet changed in a significant manner. Obviously, a $2 billion
contingent liability was such a significant change. Manville conducted informal talks with several of
its major creditors, which contributed, in part, to Manville's declaration of bankruptcy.
7. 11 USC §§ 1101-1146 (1982).
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legions of attorneys and financial advisors, were required to compromise on a
wide range of extremely complicated financial and claims handling issues.
Without the benefit of experts on management and claims settlement, the
negotiators wrestled with various procedural questions, such as how quickly,
in what priority, and through what approaches claims would be processed,
evaluated, and settled.
Two goals were fundamental to the Plan's ultimate success: first, that the
principles and strategies guiding the Trust's settlement of claims be fair to the
parties, and, second, that the agreed-upon plan of reorganization be realistic
and achievable. Only the first of these goals was met.
A.

Impact of a Trust Structure

The Manville Trust is a grantor trust. During the design period, it was
thought that tax benefits from a trust structure would be very beneficial to the
grantor, Manville. The Internal Revenue Service subsequently carved out a
special rule-the "Manville Rule"- 8 to address the Trust's unique tax status.
Since such a rule could have been attached to any organizational structure,
such as non-profit, foundation, or charitable foundation, it was unnecessary to
impose the significant encumbrances associated with a trust structure.
Probably the most unique characteristic of a trust is the strict
accountability, and thus the liability, of the trustees. Whereas corporate
directors are subject to a business rule of "reasonable business judgment,"
trustees are held to the "highest standards of care" in preserving and
enhancing the trust estate and are subject to personal liability in the event
they do not meet those standards. On paper, the trustees' unique
accountability has merit. In the context of the lack of trust between those
representing the injured claimants and Manville, the "higher standard of
care" seemed a politic choice at the time. In practice, however, it creates
financial and legal difficulties. For example, because of this unflinching
accountability, the Trust must purchase separate liability insurance for its
directors and officers (as trustees) at an annual premium cost of over $2
million. In the absence of such insurance, trustees would be personally liable
and unlikely to volunteer to take that risk. The Trust also must self-insure by
segregating $30 million of its assets as additional insurance protection. To
reduce this financial sting, the Plan limits trustee accountability by specifying
that trustees may be successfully sued only for gross negligence or willful
misconduct. 9 In practice, however, this limitation offers little comfort to
anyone asked to serve as a trustee and thus put his or her personal fortune at
risk.
The complexities associated with the trust structure are further
complicated in the Manville Trust situation by the continuing jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court. The Trust, in effect, owns Manville. While there is
8. IRC § 382, as revised by the transitional rule, Section 621(f)(4) of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub L No 99-514, 100 Stat 2085 (1986).
9. Second Amended Plan at C-85 par 5.04 (cited in note 2).
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adequate precedent on post-reorganization bankruptcy proceedings, there is
little or no legal guidance for a trust that owns a post-reorganization
company. Thus, the legal, procedural, and liability ramifications of every
issue must be minutely examined and researched.
B.

The Operation of the Trust

Although not confirmed until October 1988, the Trust began operation in
January 1987, following the bankruptcy court's appointment of trustees.
During the first seven months of 1987, several consulting organizations
assisted the trustees in handling a range of complex issues and developing a
strategy for responding to the impending deluge of claims. In October 1987,
the trustees hired this author as executive director of the Trust, and shortly
thereafter established the Trust's offices in Washington, D.C. Within six
months, the Trust had hired and trained nearly ninety-five employees and was
prepared to settle claims.' 0
In May 1988, the Trust began to negotiate settlements of the cases filed
against Manville before August 1982, all of which had been stayed by the
bankruptcy proceeding. Of the approximately 16,500 pre-bankruptcy claims
submitted to the Trust, more than 15,500 were settled for a total of
approximately $640 million. Upon consummation of the plan on November
28, 1988, the Trust was able to begin paying these pre-bankruptcy claims,
subject to certain conditions, including the receipt of an individual proof of
claim form and a signed release from each claimant. By mid-1989, an
additional 48,500 post-bankruptcy claim forms were received, for a total of
65,000 claims filed with the Trust. By the end of August 1989, the total had
risen to more than 97,000, and byJanuary 1991 more than 170,000 claimants
were seeking compensation from the Trust.
C.

The Protection of Multiple Interests and Beneficiaries

The Trust has three principal groups of beneficiaries: present claimants,
future claimants, and co-defendants. As fiduciaries, the trustees, who are
responsible for supervising and administering the claims resolution facility, 1 '
must treat the groups equally, showing no favoritism toward any one group
despite the inherent conflicts. Such conflicts exist because, for example,
claimants may be both Trust beneficiaries and litigants, and co-defendants are
beneficiaries of the Trust as well as litigants of the Trust and of the claimants.
The Trust's directives to "enhance and preserve the Trust estate" in order
to "deliver fair, adequate and equitable compensation to [claimants], whether
known or unknown," and to give "full" compensation to all claimants 12 give
rise to additional conflicts. With insufficient assets to pay even the current,
known claimants in full, the conflict is obvious.
10.
11.
12.

As ofJanuary 1991, the Trust had approximately 110 full-time staff members.
Second Amended Plan at C-80 par 2.02 (cited in note 2).
Id.
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Long-Term Funding Versus Immediate Liabilities

The Trust is funded for twenty-seven years through a complicated array of
financial instruments that form the unique financial relationship between the
Trust and Manville. The Trust is Manville's principal stockholder, holding 24
million shares (50 percent) of common stock and 7.2 million shares of
Manville series A convertible preferred stock, which is convertible into 72
million shares of common stock. 13 After conversion, the Trust would own 80
percent of Manville's common stock. As holder of two bonds with an
aggregate face value of more than $1.8 billion,' 4 the Trust is also Manville's
largest creditor. The total assets with which the Trust was funded have a face
value well in excess of $3 billion. Beginning in 1992 and continuing as long
as the Trust needs additional funds, the Trust also will receive up to 20
percent of Manville's profits under a profit-sharing agreement.' 5
As part of the 1990 court-ordered restructuring, Manville and the Trust
entered into agreements to enhance the Trust's available cash to pay claims.
The Trust's funding mechanisms, both before and after more recent
modifications, provide limited funds during early years with restrictions on
the sale of assets, and insufficient funds in the aggregate to pay all claimants.
As noted above, the bankruptcy reorganization plan states that all
claimants will receive payment from the Trust of 100 hundred percent of full
value. When the value of present claims exceeded the value of available
assets, it became clear the Trust could not meet that mandate. Even the
attempt to do so would mean selling the Trust's asset, Manville stock, and
would violate another requirement of the Plan: to preserve assets to pay
future, as-yet-unfiled claims. Despite this requirement, the Plan provided no
mechanism to hold back money for such a purpose.
E.

The Evaluation of Claims

The Trust may compensate claimants only for injuries caused by exposure
to Manville asbestos. Thus, the Plan mandates that each claim be evaluated
on its own merits considering the nature and severity of the injury, as well as
factors such as the extent of exposure to Manville products, exposure to other
manufacturers' products, jurisdictional values, and the claimant's age, wage
loss, and medical costs.1 6 So that the less costly, less risky settlement process
provided by the Trust would be more attractive to claimants, the evaluation
process was designed to consider the same factors that would be considered if
settlement, award, and verdict values were derived through litigation.
Since many of the claims resolution procedures set forth in the Plan' 7 are
expected to change dramatically under the class action settlement, it is
inappropriate in this article to discuss the old structure and premature to
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id at C-Ill par 3.01, C-113 par 3.02.
Id at C-II0 par 2.02, C-128, C-132.
Id at C-I10 par 2.03.
Id at C-101.
See generally id at C-99 to C-107.
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discuss the new. Therefore, the remaining paragraphs in this section will
discuss some of the more unusual legal and operational aspects of the Trust,
independent of the procedures that are likely to change.
F.

Payments to Pre-Bankruptcy Claimants

The bind in which the Trust found itself when it came time to pay the prebankruptcy claims illustrates the conflicts discussed in the previous section.
The controversy did not surface, however, until early 1990 when the Trust
announced an extended payment plan on current and future settlements,
under which settlements were to be paid 40 percent at settlement and 60
percent over five years.
Despite extensive efforts to call the attention of the courts and the plaintiff
bar to the critical shortfall of Trust assets available to pay claims, only the step
away from 100 percent claims payments finally brought wide awareness of the
problem. That awareness manifested itself, however, not by addressing the
cash shortfall issue directly. Instead the discussion revolved around the
amounts of the pre-bankruptcy settlements. In addition, the Trust was
criticized for its decision to pay 100 percent on all pre-bankruptcy claims,
even though the bankruptcy plan specified such and the decision was
endorsed at the time by the parties to the bankruptcy. Many appeared to feel
that the Trust had paid out too much, too soon, to the earliest claimants.
In its first year alone, the Trust disbursed over $600 million to prebankruptcy claimants. While a large sum by anyone's measure, in perspective
this amount is considerably less than it seems. Many of the 16,500 claimants
were high-value, acute injury cases; some were "Manville-only" cases (for
example, Manville plant workers), for which the Trust assumed full, rather
than the usual partial, liability. Also driving up claim value was the long wait
the pre-bankruptcy claimants had endured, a wait ranging from six to twelve
years depending on their states' docket backlog.
Despite annual medical cost increases of 11.5 percent after 1982, the Trust
kept its average settlement value at $41,150. Thus, the initial $600 million
represents less than 15,000 of the earliest, sickest claimants. At the time of
Manville's 1982 bankruptcy filing, Trust planners estimated they would have
to pay some 50,000 claimants $40,000 each. A broader study conducted some
years later estimated a greater number of claims at a lower cost per claim. As
the Trust settles the "newer" claims, the lower estimate may yet be proven
accurate.
G.

Litigation-Not Settlement-Driven

Although heavy litigation against the Trust was not contemplated by the
crafters of the reorganization plan, it was unavoidable, operationally
unmanageable, and ultimately contributed substantially to the Trust's already
troubled financial situation. As evidenced by one of the articulated purposes
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of the Trust,' 8 the crafters of the Plan genuinely wanted the Trust to be a
negotiation-based settlement organization. They wanted claimants to explore
all avenues of negotiation and alternative dispute resolution before turning to
litigation as a last resort. To meet this objective, the Plan established a
"formula" for ordering the payment of claims, allowing the Trust to take
cases docketed and scheduled for trial out of queue and settle them. This
appeared to be a reasonable approach. However, two factors led to the
Trust's inundation with active litigation. The first factor was purely
operational: the Plan permitted claimants to sue the Trust 120 days after filing
their claims with the Trust. 19 Because the Trust had received such an
enormous volume of claims and was unable to make offers on all of them
within 120 days, claimants had the right to sue and did so to improve their
position in the queue.
The second factor influencing the volume of litigation was an acceleration
in the volume of cases tried in the courts compared to the relative handful of
asbestos cases that came to trial in the mid-1980s. By 1990 four significant
class actions and tens of thousands of individual cases demanded judicial
attention. As noted above, this deluge had not been anticipated, and the Plan
did not allow modification of the Trust's operations to accommodate the
problem.
H.

Settlement Transaction Costs

The excessive unplanned litigation also had a significant financial impact
on the Trust. Prior to July 1989, before the trial docket began to drive the
Trust's business conduct, the cost of settling claims, or transaction cost
(measured as operating costs, including start-up costs as a percentage of
settlement values), was 6.1 percent of total costs. When litigation costs are
excluded, this percentage drops only slightly to 5 percent. Even with the
heavy impact of the trial docket, from inception of the Trust to the end of
1990, the Trust kept overall transaction costs to 10.4 percent. Transaction
costs excluding litigation defense costs were kept to 5.5 percent of
settlements. Had the Trust been able to avoid the cost of litigation defense, it
would have offered a low-cost alternative to traditional settlement techniques.

18. Id at C-80 par 2.02 ("with settlement to be preferred over arbitration, arbitration to be
preferred over resort to the tort system, and fair and efficient resolution of claims to be preferred
over all else").
19. Id at C-102. Under the Plan's excruciatingly detailed and entirely unreasonable time
constraints on the settlement process, the Trust must review claim forms within ten days of filing and
then contest exposure within thirty days or make a written good faith offer of settlement within
ninety days. The claimant then has ten days to respond. If the claimant makes a counter proposal,
the Trust has ten days to respond, otherwise the Trust must issue a check within twenty days.
Curiously, despite the strict response times, the sections defining the time periods begin with the
words "to the extent practical" and include a complicating general proviso that "there shall be no
artificial limitation on the number of claims handled in a given period of time." Id at C-100 to C-102.
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IV
LESSONS FOR FUTURE SETTLEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

As the Trust awaits final direction from the courts on how to proceed, it is
a good time to reflect on how lessons learned by the Trust might serve to
guide crafters of future claims resolution facilities.
A. Build In Flexibility. In crafting any plan, it is essential to articulate
the plan's objectives and devise the procedures to implement the
objectives.
However, enough flexibility must exist during
implementation to revise or replace operational approaches when
they fail to promote their intended goals.
B. Authorize the Balance of Assets and Liabilities. When the ultimate
liability of a mass tort is unknown, as will often be the case with toxic
torts, and when lengthy disease latencies preclude the imposition of
a cut-off date to limit the number of potential claims, the plan must
authorize the balance of assets and liabilities in the most equitable
and fair fashion. One viable solution to the Trust's difficulty would
have been to offer partial payments, known as a pro-rata distribution.
That proposal, now under consideration in the class action
settlement, would distribute a share of the available cash to each
settled claim based upon its proportionate value of total liability.
C. Protect Constitutional Rights. While no legal document may limit
or deny constitutionally guaranteed protections (such as the right to
trial), careful thought must be given to building incentives that
promote the behavior patterns required for ultimate success of the
settlement program. In particular, attention should focus on
building disincentives for claimant alternatives such as litigation that
will dissipate assets. The Trust is a prime example of a case where
the right to trial became a driver rather than a fallback for claimants
when all settlement approaches failed.
D. Simplify the Legal Structure. It is critical to minimize the bodies of
law with which a new organization is burdened. The Manville Trust
is subject to the law of all fifty states, as well as bankruptcy law, tort
law and traditions, corporate and business law, rules of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and complex federal legislation. Unless
a compelling reason to do so exists, placing the law of trusts in this
mix is unnecessarily burdensome.
E. Consider Management Input During the Design Stage. When lawyers
and judges without extensive business experience create procedural
and operational documents, they must involve specialists, such as
operations planners, management consultants, and organization
designers, who know how to make organizations function in the real
world. Experienced operations experts need to advise on the
practicality of the organization design, and on its goals and
flexibility. Reaching consensus through compromise can reap great
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initial benefits from a settlement perspective, but may lead to later
failure in its practical implementation phase.
V
CONCLUSION

Solutions to the Trust's dilemma are no more easily found now than they

were in 1982. The same opposing forces are struggling over the same issues
that were raised ten years ago. However, experience has shown at least two
features of claims resolution facilties that do not work:
1. Allowing easy and immediate access to the tort system forces the
Trust into a "courthouse steps settlement" posture, which is
expensive, wastes assets, skews claims values artificially high, and
neglects many needy beneficiaries.
2. Inconsistent and sometimes conflicting goals, written to achieve
settlement through compromise, create confusion, delay, and
additional litigation, slowing down or even halting operations.
There has been tremendous pressure from the media, the courts, and the
Trust beneficiaries to provide an "answer" to the asbestos liability problem.
Unfortunately, there is no quick, simple, or easy answer. To oversimplify
these complex problems only will exacerbate them in the long run.
Consideration of some of the painful lessons learned over the past three years

of Trust operation will be critical to the success of future efforts.

